Abstract. We argue that none of the existing epistemic logics can adequately serve the needs of agent theories. We suggest a new concept of knowledge which generalizes both implicit and explicit knowledge and argue that this is the notion we need to formalize agents in Distributed Articial Intelligence. A logic of the new concept is developed which i s formally and practically adequate in the following sense: rst, it does not suer from any kind of logical omniscience. Second, it can account for the intuition that agents are rational, though not hyper-rational. Third, it is expressive enough. The advantages of the new logic over other formalisms is demonstrated by showing that none of the existing systems can fulll all these requirements simultaneously.
Introduction
In recent years a number of approaches have been proposed in (Distributed) Articial Intelligence to specify rational agents in terms of mental qualities like knowledge, belief, want, goal, commitment, and intention. (See [15] for an overview of some recent agent theories.) There is no clear consensus in the DAI community about precisely which combination of mental attitudes is best suited to characterizing agents, yet it seems to be an agreement that belief (or knowledge 1 ) should be taken as one of the basic notions of the agent theory (see, e.g., [2] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] .)
Since agents need to act upon what they actually know, and not what they merely possibly know, agent theories must be based on logics that can capture what agents actually know. Although DAI researchers are aware that the modal approach to epistemic logic does not capture actual knowledge properly, they still use modal systems most frequently for modeling knowledge in their agent theories | for the lack of suitable alternatives. We shall argue that the use of modal epistemic logic is only justied in some very restricted domains, but for the more knowledge-intensive applications, other logics of knowledge are needed.
In the sequel I shall present a n o v el approach to epistemic logic which o v ercomes the weaknesses of the existing formalisms. The main idea is to combine epistemic logic with a complexity analysis: we consider how long an agent will need to compute the answer to a certain query. W e shall show that our approach oers an intuitive solution to the logical omniscience problem while preserving the intuition that agents are rational. In the next section we shall review briey the epistemic concepts which have been discussed in the literature and argue that none of them is suitable for formalizing the informational aspect of intelligent agents. Then we shall present the main intuitions underlying our novel approach, introduce a new concept of knowledge which generalizes both implicit and explicit knowledge, and develop formal theories of this new concept.
2 Implicit knowledge, explicit knowledge, and agent action
Originally, epistemic logic was developed to formalize the concept of knowledge as it is used in normal discourse, to describe what agents (actually) know. It was soon realized that this concept cannot be described by a n y \interesting" logic: it does not seems to obey any (nontrivial) logical law. From the viewpoint of agent theories, actual (explicit) knowledge is clearly more important than implicit knowledge: it is the former kind of knowledge that agents can act upon, but not the latter. The mere implicit knowledge that some path connecting all towns in a region is the shortest one is useless for a traveling salesman who seeks to maximize his prot | he must make this implicit knowledge explicit in order to choose what path to travel. The mere implicit knowledge that a certain strategy leads to victory is useless for a chess player who must make the next move within a short time. An information agent whose knowledge is represented as a knowledge base must normally make complex and time-consuming inferences before he can answer a query.
Because of the importance of explicit knowledge for agents' action, the search for logics of explicit knowledge still continues, and a number of systems have been proposed for that purpose. (For overviews and discussions see, e.g., [4] and [7, Chapter 9] .) Although the concrete solutions are very dierent, the main strategy is the same in most cases: the reasoning capacities of agents are restricted by some ad hoc postulates. Most approaches following this strategy can in fact avoid logical omniscience to some extent, and logics of explicit knowledge can be constructed, which, like Eberle's system ( [5] ), can even \[provide] for total ignoramusses (ones who knows nothing), complete idiots (ones who cannot draw e v en the most elementary inferences), and ultimate fools (ones who believe nothing but contradictions) . . . " 2 .
Why are modal epistemic logics still widely used in agent theories despite the facts that implicit knowledge is useless when agents need to act and logics of explicit knowledge are readily available? The answer is simple: because we want to model rational, intelligent agents, and not \complete idiots". Logics of explicit knowledge avoid logical omniscience, but they cannot oer anything what can account for the rationality of agents. Surely agents are not perfectly rational, yet they are rational. Facing the dilemma between \perfectly rational agents" and \complete idiots", agent theorists understandably opt for the former and use logics of implicit knowledge for modeling their agents, hoping that such logics can describe \almost correctly" what agents actually know.
The assumption underlying the use of modal epistemic logics may be justied in some simple domains (\small worlds", \toy examples"), where the reasoning tasks involved are quite simple, where the decision process is not very complex, or when the time available is unlimited. In such simple domains, it can be assumed that whenever an agent needs some (implicitly available) information, he can perform the necessary inferences to have the information explicitly. H o w ever, such an assumption is not justied in more complex applications. Agents normally have to act under tight time constraints, their decisions what actions to be performed depend heavily on their actual knowledge, and the reasoning needed for making correct choices can be very complex and time-consuming. Take the aforementioned examples: calculating the shortest tour linking all towns in a region, computing the winning strategy in chess, and inferring the answer to a query from a given database are all very hard problems. It is obvious that modal epistemic logics and other logics of implicit knowledge cannot describe correctly what agents actually know in such applications. To describe agents realistically in knowledge-intensive applications, we simply need other logics of knowledge.
What properties should a logic of knowledge have if it is to be useful for describing realistic, implementable agents? The rst obvious requirement is that it must not suer from the LOP. H o w ever, solving the LOP does not automatically make a logic suitable for reasoning about knowledge. There are other requirements that the logic must fulll. It is important that the logic can do justice to the intuition that agents are rational: although the agents do not automatically know all consequences of their knowledge, they are in principle able to do so. Because of this rationality the agents are able to act upon their knowledge: they can answer questions based on their knowledge, they can plan their actions in advance, they can predict what other agents can and will do, and so on. If a logic cannot account for the agents' rationality, then there is hardly any justication at all to call it a logic of knowledge. Another important requirement is that the logic be expressive enough to formalize \interesting" situations. This condition must remain somewhat vague, because dierent applications will require dierent expressive powers of the logic. However, we should keep in mind that the complexity of a logic generally increases with its expressive p o w er, so we m ust try to nd a good trade-o between expressiveness and simplicity.
3 Knowledge, reasoning, and time
The existing systems of epistemic logic try to deal with either implicit knowledge or explicit knowledge. The former concept is not very helpful when agents must act, while the latter is not governed by a n y non-trivial logic. To develop useful alternatives to existing epistemic logics we suggest to consider another notion of knowledge. The main intuition is the following. An agent's action depends not only on what he knows now, but also on what he can infer within some specic amount of time (intuitively, the time within which a decision must be made | a classical example being the time available to make the next move i n c hess.) An agent may not know a sentence now, but he may possess a procedure to 'prove' that sentence within a certain amount of time, where the amount of time needed depends on the complexity of the sentence, the agent's reasoning power, etc. If an agent knows that another agent m ust act under some time constraint, he may infer what the second agent can or cannot know within this constraint and predict his action accordingly. Therefore, it is worth considering what the agents can know within 1; 2; 3; : : : time units, and not just what they currently know, i.e., what they know within 0 unit of time.
We w ant to represent not only what agents know or can know, but also when they are expected to know what they can know. The rst question is answered by specifying the logic used by agents in their reasoning, and the second by a complexity analysis. What time structure do we need in modeling that kind of knowledge? Temporal logics have been dealing with linear and branching, point-based and interval-based, qualitative and quantitative time structures. Our obvious choice is a point-based, linear structure with a metric dened on it, because temporal constraints are usually given in quantitative terms and over a linear time line. For simplicity w e assume time to be isomorph to the natural numbers (with the usual ordering and metric.)
The language we consider extends the usual language of the propositional calculus by n two-place knowledge operators K 1 ; : : : ; K n , each for one agent, such that K x i is a formula whenever x is a natural number and is a formula. The formula K x i can be read \agent i knows within x units of time" and is interpreted: \if agent i chooses to 'derive' from his current knowledge, then after at most x time units he will succeed", or alternatively, \if asked about , i is able to derive reliably the answer 'yes' within x units of time". That is, we require not only that i has at least one procedure to 'prove' , but also that i be able to choose the correct procedure leading to under the given time constraint, namely, to arrive at the conclusion after at most x time units 3 . The word 'prove' (or 'derive') should not be interpreted too narrowly as 'deductive proof': the procedure to gain the knowledge of may b e a n y acceptable method, e.g., sensing the environment, looking up in a standard reference book, or asking some expert.
Formally, our language is dened as follows: Denition 1. Let N be the set of natural numbers and V a r be a set of number variables. Let Agent be a nite set of agents and At be a countably innite set of atomic formulae.
1. The set of temporal terms is the least set T e r m such that N T e r m , V a r T e r m , and t 1 ; t 2 2 T e r m implies t 1 + t 2 2 T e r m 2. The set of formulae is the least set F m l such that At F m l , f ; g F m l implies f:; ^g F m l , x 2 V a r and 2 F m l imply 8x 2 F m l , and i 2 Agent, t 2 T e r m , 2 F m l imply K t i 2 F m l . The other propositional connectives (_; !) and the existential quantiers (9) are dened as usual.
Our notion of knowledge could be called \algorithmic knowledge": knowledge is tied up with an algorithm to establish it. But the term should be used with care: \algorithmic knowledge" has been used with dierent meanings elsewhere ( [1] , [7] ). In our framework, \i knows explicitly" can be dened as K 0 i . Implicit knowledge can be dened as what follows logically from explicit knowledge (relative to some suitable logic.) Another useful concept of implicit knowledge can be dened as what can be reliably established by the agent: \i knows implicitly" means 9xK
x i . The rationality of agents is expressed through two capacities: rst, the ability to draw logical consequences from what is already known, and second, the ability to compute the complexities of certain reasoning problems in order to infer when something can be known. Note that these too capacities are implementable. It turns out that we can develop quite rich theories of the notion of knowledge we h a v e i n troduced.
To develop logics of algorithmic knowledge we try to establish logical relationships among the formulae of the language we h a v e dened. This is done by developing our earlier framework ( [3] , [4] ) a step further. In [3] and [4] we h a v e suggested a new approach to epistemic logic which o v ercomes the drawbacks of existing approaches. The idea is to consider the evolution of one's knowledge over time: at one moment an agent m a y o r m a y not know (explicitly) a certain consequence of his knowledge; however, he can perform some reasoning steps to know it at some moment in the future. We h a v e argued that the traditional approaches fail to capture the concept of actual knowledge correctly because they do not take the cost of inferring new information into account: they assume that whenever an agent knows all premises of a valid inference rule then she automatically knows the conclusion. We h a v e shown that axioms for epistemic logics must have the form: \if the agent knows all premises of a valid inference rule, and if she performs the correct inference step, then she will know the conclusion". Following this idea we h a v e developed logics that can solve all forms of the logical omniscience problem and at the same time can account for the intuition that agents are rational beings. However, the systems presented (and indicated) in [3] and [4] have too little expressive p o w er: they are not able to describe situations where introspective reasoning or reasoning about the reasoning of other agents is required. Moreover, they are based on a non-metrical branching time structure, which makes it very dicult to deal with time constrains. These problems are avoided in the present paper.
Our logics of knowledge will be built up step by step from some basis logic. We shall take classical logic as our basis logic. As we assume the natural numbers as our time structure, we shall also assume some laws of number theory. For our purposes it suces to assume Presburger arithmetic (i.e., additive n umber theory.) Our epistemic systems will be obtained by adding (proper) epistemic laws to this basis. Now let us see how such l a ws may look like.
Suppose that an agent i knows within x units of time, i.e., he needs x time units to infer if needed. Then it is plausible to assume that he is able to do it when even more time is available. So we can take as axiom all ground instances of the formula K , where x < y . Note that this axiom does not say that knowledge is persistent in the sense that once established it will be available henceforth. In this aspect our present approach makes a more realistic assumption than the persistence axiom in [4] . Now let us assume that an agent i knows explicitly 1 ; : : : ; n and that 1^: : : n ! is valid (i.e., follows logically from the premises 1 ; : : : ; n ).
What can be said about agent i's information state? Of course we cannot assume that i knows automatically, e v en if can be deduced from 1 ; : : : ; n algorithmically: perhaps i just does not care about and does not even try to prove it. If he wants to know then he has to perform some inferences, which can be very hard and time-consuming. His reasoning takes some time, so we can only say reliably that he will know after some time if he chooses to de- In the preceding paragraph we h a v e considered the case when the premises 1 ; : : : ; n are explicitly available to the agent, so that he can use them immediately to derive the conclusion . Consider now the more general case where the premises 1 ; : : : ; n are not immediately available but need to be inferred separately, i.e., K x1 i 1 ; : : : ; K x n i n for some x 1 ; : : : ; x n . Because x j < x 1 + : : : + x n for all j = 1; : : : ; n w e may assume that i can derive every premise within x 1 + : : : + x n units of time. Once the premises are available they can be used to infer the conclusion . Thus, it is plausible to adopt the principle 
Knowledge and complexity
Now w e h a v e developed LAK0, a basic logic of algorithmic knowledge which can account for rational, but not hyper-rational agents. The set of LAK0-theorems is recursively enumerable and so can be generated algorithmically. I f follows from and an agent i knows then he can employ a theorem prover for LAK0 to deduce , so he will know after some time.
But how long will the agent need to infer a formula which follows logically from his knowledge base? Recall that our aim is to represent not only what agents know or can know, but also when they are expected to know what they can know. Our analyses up to now can only answer the rst question. To answer the the second question, a complexity analysis is needed. The underlying idea is simple: if an agent i receives a query of length l and the complexity of computing answers to queries of that class is a function f, then after at most c i f(l) units of time he is expected to have the answer, where c i i s a n umber that measures the computation speed of i.
It is still an open question what is the exact complexity of the decision problem for LAK0. I t i s w ell-known that Presburger arithmetic is decidable, but we still do not know whether or not the system LAK0 is decidable. Therefore a complexity analysis for the whole system LAK0 seems to be impossible. However, there are problem classes which can be expressed in LAK0 and whose complexities are known. Hence we can analyze such problems and estimate the amount of time an agent w ould need to infer some piece of information. With the help of complexity theory we can obtain epistemic principles for specic problem classes. Adding those principles to the basic system LAK0 will yield more powerful logics of algorithmic knowledge. Let us consider some examples.
Assume that currently an agent i's explicit knowledge (his knowledge base) is a set = f 1 ; : : : ; n g of sentences. Let be a propositional consequence of .
We cannot assume that i automatically knows , h o w ever simple the derivation of from may be. To know , i has to perform some inferences, which take some time. The amount of time needed to answer the query can be estimated with the help of complexity theory. Let m = k 1 k + : : : + k n k be the size of and l = kk be the size of . T o determine if is in fact a consequence of , our agent may check i f every truth-value assignment which falsies also falsies . There are at most 2 l such assignments, and the time needed to check i f an assignment satises is polynomial to the size of . Hence, i can reliably know in some time proportional to P(m)2 l for some polynomial P. Let What about self-introspection? Positive introspection is relatively easy, so for any formula we m a y adopt the axiom 8x(K
, which s a ys that after proving , agent i may i n trospect his knowledge and discovers that he knows . F or negative i n trospection we cannot expect to have a n y axiom of that generality, but we m a y still have some rules for special cases.
It is sometimes important t o k n o w not only what an agent knows, but also what he does not know within a certain time limit. For instance, when we use public-key cryptography to encrypt a message, we w ant to be sure that someone without the secret key will not be able to know its content within reasonable time | although he can in principle infer it from the public key. The expectation that our message cannot be quickly decrypted is based on the complexity of the reasoning required: we use lower complexity bounds to estimate the least amount of time that an agent w ould need to infer some sentence, and so to infer what he cannot reliably know within some given limit of time.
Conclusions
We h a v e argued that existing agent theories are developed on inadequate epistemic foundations. We h a v e then proposed a new epistemic concept, the concept of algorithmic knowledge, which generalizes both notions of knowledge considered in the literature: that of explicit and that of implicit knowledge. Logics of our concept of algorithmic knowledge have been developed following a clear methodology. The main idea is to combine epistemic logic with a complexity analysis: we consider how long an agent will need to compute the answer to a certain query. I t i s s h o wn that our approach can account adequately for our intuitions about knowledge and that it solves the problems associated with other approaches. In contrast to logics of implicit knowledge such as modal systems or the deduction model, our logics can describe realistic, entirely non-omniscient agents. But unlike logics of explicit knowledge, our systems are capable of describing rational agents, who can use their reasoning capacities to infer new information from what they know. Moreover, our systems have a greater expressive p o w er than most existing logics. For example, time constraints can be expressed easily in our framework.
Currently there still exists a wide gap between agent theories and agents existing in practice. Our work is an attempt to bridge this gap. We are trying to develop theories of mental concepts that make m uch more realistic assumptions about agents than other theories. Our work is guided by the principle that the capacities attributed to agents must be implementable. Much remains to be done to develop our framework further. But we rmly believe that our framework is a v ery useful one, which can be used to represent the kind of knowledge needed by agent theories better than any other existing logic of knowledge.
